Golpe assistido pela CIA derruba governo do Irã

Golpe assistido pela CIA derruba governo do Irã

Os militares iranianos, com o apoio e assistência financeira do governo dos Estados Unidos, derrubam o governo do primeiro-ministro Mohammad Mosaddeq e reintegram o Xá do Irã. O Irã continuou sendo um sólido aliado dos Estados Unidos na Guerra Fria até que uma revolução pôs fim ao governo do Xá em 1979.

Mosaddeq ganhou destaque no Irã em 1951, quando foi nomeado primeiro-ministro. Nacionalista feroz, Mosaddeq imediatamente começou a atacar as empresas petrolíferas britânicas que operavam em seu país, pedindo a expropriação e nacionalização dos campos de petróleo. Suas ações o colocaram em conflito com as elites pró-ocidentais do Irã e do Xá, Mohammed Reza Pahlevi. De fato, o xá demitiu Mossadeq em meados de 1952, mas protestos públicos massivos condenando a ação forçaram o xá a reintegrar Mossadeq pouco tempo depois. As autoridades americanas assistiram aos eventos no Irã com suspeitas crescentes. Fontes da inteligência britânica, trabalhando com a Agência Central de Inteligência Americana (CIA), chegaram à conclusão de que Mossadeq tinha tendências comunistas e colocaria o Irã na órbita soviética se tivesse permissão para permanecer no poder.

Trabalhando com Shah, a CIA e a inteligência britânica começaram a arquitetar um complô para derrubar Mossadeq. O primeiro-ministro iraniano, no entanto, ficou sabendo do plano e convocou seus apoiadores para irem às ruas em protesto. Nesse ponto, o Xá deixou o país por “motivos médicos”. Enquanto a inteligência britânica recuava do desastre, a CIA continuou suas operações secretas no Irã. Trabalhando com as forças pró-Shah e, ​​mais importante, os militares iranianos, a CIA persuadiu, ameaçou e subornou para chegar à influência e ajudou a organizar outra tentativa de golpe contra Mossadeq. Em 19 de agosto de 1953, os militares, apoiados por protestos de rua organizados e financiados pela CIA, derrubaram Mossadeq. O Xá rapidamente voltou a assumir o poder e, como agradecimento pela ajuda americana, cedeu mais de 40 por cento dos campos de petróleo do Irã para empresas dos EUA.

Mossadeq foi preso, cumpriu três anos de prisão e morreu em prisão domiciliar em 1967. O Xá se tornou um dos aliados mais confiáveis ​​da Guerra Fria da América, e a ajuda econômica e militar dos EUA foi derramada no Irã durante as décadas de 1950, 1960 e 1970. Em 1978, no entanto, protestos anti-Xá e anti-americanos estouraram no Irã e o Xá foi derrubado do poder em 1979. Militantes furiosos tomaram a embaixada dos EUA e mantiveram a equipe americana como refém até janeiro de 1981. Nacionalismo, não comunismo, provou que sim ser a ameaça mais séria ao poder dos EUA no Irã.


CIA admite papel no golpe iraniano de 1953

A CIA admitiu publicamente pela primeira vez que estava por trás do notório golpe de 1953 contra o primeiro-ministro democraticamente eleito do Irã, Mohammad Mosaddeq, em documentos que também mostram como o governo britânico tentou bloquear a divulgação de informações sobre seu próprio envolvimento em sua derrubada.

No 60º aniversário de um evento frequentemente invocado pelos iranianos como evidência de intromissão ocidental, o arquivo de segurança nacional dos EUA na Universidade George Washington publicou uma série de documentos desclassificados da CIA.

"O golpe militar que derrubou Mosaddeq e seu gabinete da Frente Nacional foi realizado sob a direção da CIA como um ato da política externa dos EUA, concebido e aprovado nos mais altos níveis do governo", diz uma seção previamente extirpada de uma história interna da CIA intitulada A Batalha para o Irã.

Os documentos, publicados no site do arquivo sob as leis de liberdade de informação, descrevem em detalhes como os EUA - com a ajuda britânica - arquitetaram o golpe, de codinome TPAJAX pela CIA e Operação Boot pelo MI6 da Grã-Bretanha.

A Grã-Bretanha, e em particular Sir Anthony Eden, o secretário de Relações Exteriores, considerou Mosaddeq uma séria ameaça aos seus interesses estratégicos e econômicos depois que o líder iraniano nacionalizou a British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, mais tarde conhecida como BP. Mas o Reino Unido precisava do apoio dos EUA. O governo Eisenhower em Washington foi facilmente persuadido.

Documentos britânicos mostram como altos funcionários na década de 1970 tentaram impedir Washington de divulgar documentos que seriam "muito constrangedores" para o Reino Unido.

Os jornais oficiais no Reino Unido permanecem secretos, embora os relatos sobre o papel da Grã-Bretanha no golpe sejam generalizados. Em 2009, o ex-secretário de Relações Exteriores Jack Straw se referiu publicamente a muitas "interferências" britânicas nos assuntos iranianos do século XX. Na segunda-feira, o Ministério das Relações Exteriores disse que não podia confirmar nem negar o envolvimento da Grã-Bretanha no golpe.

Os documentos americanos anteriormente classificados incluem telegramas de Kermit Roosevelt, o oficial sênior da CIA no Irã durante o golpe. Outros, incluindo um rascunho da história interna da CIA, escrito por Scott Kock, intitulado Zendebad, Shah! (Viva, Shah!), Diga que, de acordo com Monty Woodhouse, chefe da estação do MI6 em Teerã na época, a Grã-Bretanha precisava do apoio dos EUA para um golpe. Eden concordou. "Woodhouse interpretou suas palavras como equivalentes à permissão para levar adiante a ideia" com os Estados Unidos, escreveu Kock.

A queda de Mosaddeq, ainda dada como uma razão para a desconfiança iraniana dos políticos britânicos e americanos, consolidou o governo do xá pelos 26 anos seguintes, até a revolução islâmica de 1979. O objetivo era garantir que a monarquia iraniana salvaguardasse os interesses petrolíferos do Ocidente no país.

Os documentos arquivados da CIA incluem um rascunho da história interna do golpe intitulado "Campanha para instalar um governo pró-ocidental no Irã", que define o objetivo da campanha como "por meio de métodos legais, ou quase-legais, para efetuar a queda do Governo Mosaddeq e substituí-lo por um governo pró-ocidental sob a liderança do Xá com Zahedi como primeiro-ministro ”.

Um documento descreve Mosaddeq como um dos "líderes mais mercuriais, enlouquecedores, hábeis e provocadores com quem eles [os EUA e a Grã-Bretanha] já negociaram". O documento diz que Mosaddeq "achou o mal britânico, não incompreensível" e "ele e milhões de iranianos acreditaram que durante séculos a Grã-Bretanha manipulou seu país para fins britânicos". Outro documento refere-se a uma "guerra de nervos" contra Mossadeq.

O historiador armênio-iraniano Ervand Abrahamian, autor de O Golpe: 1953, a CIA e as Raízes das Relações Modernas EUA-Irã, disse em uma entrevista recente que o golpe foi planejado "para se livrar de uma figura nacionalista que insistia que o petróleo deveria ser nacionalizado ".

Ao contrário de outros líderes nacionalistas, incluindo Gamal Abdel Nasser do Egito, Mosaddeq sintetizou uma figura "anticolonial" única que também estava comprometida com os valores democráticos e os direitos humanos, argumentou Abrahamian.

Alguns analistas argumentam que Mosaddeq não conseguiu se comprometer com o Ocidente e que o golpe ocorreu em um contexto de temores de comunismo no Irã. "Meu estudo dos documentos me prova que nunca houve realmente um compromisso justo oferecido a Mosaddeq, o que eles queriam que Mosaddeq fizesse é desistir da nacionalização do petróleo e se ele tivesse dado isso, é claro, o movimento nacional não teria sentido ", disse ele à publicação online iraniana, a revista Tableau.

"Meu argumento é que nunca houve realmente uma ameaça realista de comunismo ... o discurso e a forma de justificar qualquer ato era falar sobre o perigo comunista, então era algo usado para o público, especialmente o público americano e britânico."

Apesar dos últimos lançamentos, um número significativo de documentos sobre o golpe permanece secreto. Malcolm Byrne, vice-diretor do arquivo de segurança nacional, pediu às autoridades de inteligência dos EUA que liberassem os registros e documentos restantes.

"Não há mais uma boa razão para manter segredos sobre um episódio tão crítico em nosso passado recente. Os fatos básicos são amplamente conhecidos por todas as crianças em idade escolar no Irã", disse ele. "Suprimir os detalhes apenas distorce a história e alimenta a criação de mitos por todos os lados."

Nos últimos anos, políticos iranianos têm procurado comparar a disputa sobre as atividades nucleares do país com a da nacionalização do petróleo sob Mosaddeq: partidários do ex-presidente Mahmoud Ahmadinejad costumam invocar o golpe.

Autoridades americanas já expressaram pesar sobre o golpe, mas não apresentaram um pedido oficial de desculpas. O governo britânico nunca reconheceu seu papel.


História dos EUA de 1877 até o presente final

Idéia de necessidade crescente de intervenção e ativismo governamental.

O fim da Segunda Guerra Mundial guiou os Estados Unidos para uma nova era de liberalismo, com o liberalismo da Guerra Fria.
- Reter programas de bem-estar social, anticomunista, plataforma de Direitos Civis
O que o liberalismo da Guerra Fria conseguiu?
- Acordo justo (continuando o Novo Acordo)
- Legislação de direitos civis, incluindo a lei de direitos civis e a lei de direitos de voto
- Grande Sociedade e Guerra à Pobreza de Lyndon Johnson
1. Listar programas, esp. Medicare / Medicaid / Estudo de trabalho / etc

A Guerra do Vietnã foi o maior fator de divisão da queda do liberalismo. O número crescente de mortos no Vietnã criou sentimentos e movimentos anti-guerra nos EUA
- Levou à eleição de 1968 - quando tudo foi um ano traumático para o liberalismo
1. Tet Ofensiva
2. MLK Jr. Assassination
3. Presença democrática candidato Robert Kennedy Assassination caos for Dems
4. Motins na Convenção Nacional Democrata - fogo policial e métodos brutais para conter os desordeiros levam ao colapso virtual do Partido Democrata na TV.
5. Nov. - Nixon (Repub.) É eleito com a & quot maioria quotsilent & quot e estratégia do Sul


Golpe assistido pela CIA derruba governo do Irã - HISTÓRIA

& bull Um golpe é a abreviatura de & quotcoup d & rsquoetat & quot, um termo francês que significa a derrubada do governo. O elemento-chave de um golpe é que ele é realizado além dos limites da legalidade. Golpes podem ser violentos, mas não precisam ser.

& bull Algumas das coisas que Trump fez desde novembro para contestar a eleição estão claramente dentro da lei. Outras ações dele até 6 de janeiro foram fechadas.

& bull Os legisladores que se opõem à contagem dos votos eleitorais estão agindo dentro das regras para se opor, de modo que isso não seria considerado um golpe.

& bull Um bom argumento pode ser feito de que a invasão do Capitol se qualifica como um golpe. Foi especialmente assim porque os desordeiros entraram precisamente no momento em que a perda do incumbente deveria ser formalmente selada, e eles conseguiram parar a contagem.

& bull O ataque ao Capitólio também parece ser qualificado como sedição, que é o uso de & ldquoforce para prevenir, impedir ou atrasar a execução de qualquer lei dos Estados Unidos & rdquo ou da autoridade do governo dos EUA.

Os americanos estão testemunhando um golpe? Antes da invasão do Capitólio dos Estados Unidos em 6 de janeiro, o caso era discutível, mas não um golpe mortal. Depois que o Capitol foi violado, o caso ficou mais claro, dizem os especialistas.

As perguntas derivam da reação do presidente Donald Trump e rsquos ao perder a eleição presidencial de 2020. Trump e seus partidários entraram com uma série de ações judiciais rejeitadas pelos tribunais, procuraram forçar as autoridades locais a mudar os resultados e sugeriram incorretamente que o vice-presidente Mike Pence poderia derrubar a vontade do colégio eleitoral ao presidir a contagem de as cédulas.

Se os EUA estavam testemunhando um golpe parecia especulativo até a violenta invasão da Câmara e do Senado no dia em que os votos do Colégio Eleitoral deveriam ser contados, certificando oficialmente a vitória de Biden.

Aqui estão algumas perguntas e respostas sobre o que constitui um golpe, bem como outro conceito que está cada vez mais sendo discutido, a sedição.

Golpe é a abreviatura de & quotcoup d & rsquoetat & quot, termo francês que significa derrubada do governo. O elemento-chave de um golpe é que ele é realizado além dos limites da legalidade.

& quotDefinimos golpe d & # 39 & eacutetat como a remoção súbita e irregular (ou seja, ilegal ou extra-legal), ou deslocamento, da autoridade executiva de um governo independente & quot, escreveu o Projeto Coup D & rsquoetat na Universidade de Illinois & rsquo Cline Center for Democracy em 2013.

O Cline Center caracterizou 12 tipos de golpes. Vários deles não são relevantes para a situação atual, incluindo golpes palacianos, golpes militares, contra-golpes, golpes estrangeiros, transições mediadas internacionalmente, e demissões forçadas.

Outros podem ser, incluindo & quottentativa de golpe& quot e & quotconspirações golpistas.& quot

Antes da violação do Capitólio, alguns funcionários e comentaristas sugeriram que o presidente Donald Trump, com ações como tentar fazer com que o secretário de estado da Geórgia, Brad Raffensberger, "encontrasse" votos suficientes para ele ganhar o estado, estava efetivamente tentando um golpe. Outros disseram que alguns legisladores que se opuseram à contagem das chapas do Colégio Eleitoral no Congresso estavam criando um golpe.

Essas ações podem se enquadrar na categoria de auto-golpes, em que o líder dá força a outros ramos do governo para consolidar o poder.

"Esses golpes envolvem o atual chefe do executivo tomando medidas extremas para eliminar ou tornar impotentes outros componentes do governo (o legislativo, o poder judiciário, etc.)", disse o relatório do Cline Center de 2013. & quotIsso também inclui situações em que o chefe do Executivo simplesmente assume poderes extraordinários de maneira ilegal ou extra-legal (ou seja, vai além das medidas extraordinárias incluídas na constituição do país, como a declaração do estado de emergência). & quot

O telefonema de Trump & rsquos para o secretário de estado da Geórgia pode muito bem ser qualificado como uma "medida extrema" e "ilegal ou extra-legal", embora especialistas jurídicos tenham dito que pode ser um caso difícil de processar.

Vários comentaristas aplicaram o rótulo de golpe à objeção à contagem dos votos eleitorais pelos legisladores também.

Falando em uma sessão do Senado para debater objeções à contagem de votos eleitorais, o líder da minoria no Senado, Chuck Schumer, DN.Y., disse: & quotSadder e mais perigoso ainda é o fato de que um elemento do Partido Republicano acredita que sua viabilidade política depende do endosso de uma tentativa de golpe. & quot

Pode ser mais difícil argumentar que o esforço no Congresso equivale a um golpe. A lei que rege a contagem permite que as objeções sejam registradas, debatidas e, em caso de votação das câmaras, dispensadas. Isso faz parte da lei, não algo fora dela.

A polícia vigia os manifestantes que tentaram romper uma barreira policial em 6 de janeiro de 2021, no Capitólio dos Estados Unidos. (AP / John Minchillo)

As ações de alguns manifestantes no Capitólio dos EUA, no entanto, estavam claramente fora da lei, especialmente as pessoas que conseguiram chegar ao plenário da Câmara e do Senado e aos escritórios pessoais dos legisladores.

Falando à CNN enquanto o Capitólio estava sendo violado, o Dep. Adam Kinziger, R-Ill., Disse: & quotEm qualquer lugar do mundo, chamaríamos isso de uma tentativa de golpe, e isso & # 39 é o que eu penso & quot; NBC News & rsquo Lester Holt disse: "Houve alguns elementos de uma tentativa de golpe".

Eles estão certos? Vamos começar observando que, embora a violência faça parte de muitos golpes, ser violento não é uma condição necessária. (Pelo menos uma pessoa morreu supostamente após ser baleada dentro do Capitólio.)

Dito isso, as ações com base no Capitol podem fortalecer o caso para chamar isso de uma tentativa de golpe.

Na manhã em que o Capitólio foi violado, e enquanto a Câmara e o Senado se preparavam para contar os votos eleitorais, Trump falou pessoalmente a milhares de apoiadores reunidos entre a Casa Branca e o Monumento a Washington. Ele chamou a eleição presidencial de a mais corrupta da história do país e repetiu as alegações não comprovadas de fraude eleitoral que não conseguiram encontrar tração nos tribunais de todo o país.

Ele disse à multidão que eles precisavam lutar por seu país. "Se você não lutar como o diabo, não terá mais um país", disse ele.

Ele encerrou dizendo: & quotNós vamos caminhar pela Avenida Pensilvânia & quot, disse Trump. "Vamos tentar dar aos nossos republicanos, os fracos, porque os fortes não precisam de nossa ajuda, vamos tentar dar a eles o tipo de orgulho e ousadia de que precisam para recuperar o nosso país. & quot

Trump encerrou seus comentários instando a multidão a marchar pela Avenida Pensilvânia até o Congresso, sugerindo que se juntaria a eles (embora não o fizesse). No Capitólio, parte do grupo invadiu o prédio, fazendo com que a Câmara e o Senado interrompessem o debate e deixassem a câmara.

Várias categorias de golpes compartilham alguns elementos desse cenário, embora nenhum se encaixe perfeitamente.

& quotGolpes rebeldes, & quot de acordo com o Cline Center, requerem & quotan grupo militarizado organizado que está contestando ativamente as forças do governo & quot, embora & quotmilitarized & quot pode ser uma descrição muito generosa dos grupos desorganizados que entraram no Capitol.

Outra categoria é & quotações dissidentes, & quot que envolvem & quotsmall grupos de descontentes & quot, embora as dezenas de milhares de manifestantes em Washington em 6 de janeiro fossem provavelmente mais numerosos do que esta categoria imagina.

& quotRevoltas populares & quotincluem & quot mudanças de regime irregulares que são impulsionadas por uma insatisfação popular generalizada com um governo que se manifesta por altos níveis de agitação civil. & quot Isso também não & quot; rs & quot; bem & quot ;, uma vez que os resultados eleitorais não mostraram & quot; generalizado & quot; apoio popular para Trump permanecer no cargo.

Por outro lado, outros elementos das ações de 6 de janeiro se enquadram na definição geral de golpe.

Um número considerável de cidadãos foi instado pelo presidente a assumir a cadeira do poder legislativo precisamente no momento em que a perda do titular estava para ser formalmente selada. O grupo violou as leis entrando no prédio, causando danos no interior e forçando a suspensão do processo de contagem dos votos eleitorais.

Tudo isso parece se encaixar na categoria de uma & quotsudden e remoção irregular (ou seja, ilegal ou extra-legal), ou deslocamento, da autoridade executiva de um governo independente. & Quot De repente, as leis foram quebradas e as funções oficiais do governo foram deslocados. (Para que isso se aplique, é preciso imaginar o presidente eleito Joe Biden como a "autoridade executiva", em vez de Trump, o presidente em exercício, mas pato manco.)

"Evitar que a legislatura nacional seja usada pela força parece um protesto golpista pacífico, obviamente, não", disse Michael Klarman, professor da Escola de Direito de Harvard.

Anthony Clark Arend, um especialista em direito internacional da Universidade de Georgetown, disse que está cético em rotular os desafios dos legisladores ao voto eleitoral como um golpe, mas acha que isso pode ser válido para a tomada do Capitólio.

"Acho que as ações violentas dos manifestantes que atualmente ocupam parte do Capitólio podem ser vistas como uma tentativa de golpe", disse Arend. "Na medida em que o presidente pode ser visto como um incentivador dessas ações, eu diria que ele está apoiando uma tentativa de golpe."

Apoiadores de Trump tentam quebrar uma barreira policial em 6 de janeiro de 2021, no Capitólio dos EUA em Washington. (AP / John Minchillo)

Vários comentaristas, incluindo CNN e rsquos Jake Tapper, classificaram as ações dos manifestantes como uma sedição. A sedição é geralmente definida como conduta ou discurso que incita as pessoas a se rebelarem contra a autoridade de um governo.

Este parece ser um descritor ainda mais claro dos eventos de 6 de janeiro.

Uma conspiração sediciosa é definida na lei federal como duas ou mais pessoas & quot conspirando) para derrubar, derrubar ou destruir pela força o Governo dos Estados Unidos & hellip ou opor-se pela força à sua autoridade, ou pela força para impedir , impedir ou atrasar a execução de qualquer lei dos Estados Unidos, ou pela força apreender, tomar ou possuir qualquer propriedade dos Estados Unidos em violação à sua autoridade. & quot A lei vem com multa ou prisão de até 20 anos , ou ambos.

A invasão do Capitólio parece qualificar-se como o uso de & quotforce para prevenir, dificultar ou atrasar a execução de qualquer lei dos Estados Unidos & quot ou da autoridade do governo dos EUA.

"As pessoas que invadiram o edifício do Capitólio parecem claramente qualificadas para um processo sob esta disposição", disse Carlton Larson, professor de direito da Universidade da Califórnia-Davis.

James Robenalt, advogado com experiência em crises políticas, concorda. "O que estamos vendo é sedição", disse ele. & quotTodos os que estão ocorrendo e aqueles em conspiração são culpados e puníveis. & quot


Documentos revelam novos detalhes sobre o papel da CIA no golpe de 1953 no Irã

Documentos recém-desclassificados oferecem mais detalhes de como a CIA executou a derrubada do primeiro-ministro democraticamente eleito do Irã 60 anos atrás, descrevendo as frustrações políticas que levaram os EUA a tomar medidas encobertas contra um aliado soviético - e ecoando as atuais frustrações com o Irã por causa de sua ambições nucleares.

Há muito se sabe que os Estados Unidos e a Grã-Bretanha desempenharam papéis importantes na derrubada do primeiro-ministro iraniano, Mohammed Mossadegh - um movimento que ainda envenena a atitude de Teerã em relação às duas nações. A CIA reconheceu seu papel anteriormente, até mesmo incluindo-o na linha do tempo em seu site público no ano passado: "Golpe de 19 de agosto de 1953 auxiliado pela CIA derruba o premier iraniano Mohammed Mossadegh."

Mossadegh foi substituído pelo regime opressor do xá Reza Pahlavi, que foi derrubado em 1979 por seguidores do aiatolá Ruhollah Khomeini na revolução iraniana de 1979.

Mas para os historiadores, os documentos fortemente editados postados esta semana no Arquivo de Segurança Nacional da George Washington University equivalem a "o primeiro reconhecimento formal da CIA de que a agência ajudou a planejar e executar o golpe", disse o arquivo em seu site.

Os documentos também oferecem uma explicação para a ação secreta que é assustadoramente semelhante aos argumentos para conter as ambições nucleares do Irã hoje. A CIA argumentou então que o Irã estava ameaçando a segurança do Ocidente ao não cooperar com o Ocidente - na época, recusando-se a negociar com a Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., de propriedade britânica - ameaçando assim o fornecimento de petróleo barato à Grã-Bretanha e arriscando uma invasão britânica que poderia, por sua vez, desencadear uma contra-invasão soviética aos campos de petróleo iranianos.

Os documentos descrevem como o terremoto político iraniano seria realizado. Um artigo intitulado "Campanha para Instalar Governo Pró-Ocidente na Autoridade do Irã" lista os objetivos como "por meio de métodos legais ou quase-legais, para efetuar a queda do governo de Mossadegh", incluindo "expor sua colaboração com os comunistas" e " para substituí-lo por um governo pró-Ocidente sob a liderança do Xá. "

Em um documento intitulado "A Batalha pelo Irã", a CIA revela que o plano de golpe foi chamado de "Operação TPAJAX". O autor anônimo da história escreve que relatos publicados anteriormente não entendem que "o golpe militar que derrubou Mossadegh. Foi realizado sob a direção da CIA como um ato da política externa dos EUA, concebido e aprovado nos mais altos níveis do governo." O autor acrescenta que o plano do golpe foi "uma admissão oficial (redigida) de que os métodos normais e racionais de comunicação e comércio internacional falharam. O TPAJAX foi adotado como último recurso".

Os papéis outrora secretos também descrevem a inquietação do governo britânico quando diplomatas dos EUA revelaram no final dos anos 1970 que os papéis dos EUA e da Grã-Bretanha na derrubada poderiam ser tornados públicos com o eventual lançamento de tais documentos sob o novo Ato de Liberdade de Informação dos EUA - o mesmo ato que o National Security Archive, com sede em Washington, usou para obter a versão mais recente.

"Solicitei esses materiais específicos em 2000 e levei 11 anos para obtê-los", disse Malcolm Byrne, do arquivo, em um e-mail para a Associated Press na terça-feira.

Os líderes iranianos pedem desculpas oficiais desde o golpe. Os EUA e o Irã continuam em desacordo sobre os planos do Irã de construir seu sistema de energia nuclear e, supostamente, capacidade de armas nucleares.

O presidente Bill Clinton quase se desculpou em comentários indiretos em 1999, e o presidente Barack Obama reconheceu as ações dos EUA em seu discurso no Cairo em 2009.

"No meio da Guerra Fria, os Estados Unidos desempenharam um papel na derrubada de um governo iraniano eleito democraticamente", disse Obama ao público egípcio, citando isso como um motivo de tensão entre os dois países.


Iranianos, Invocando o Golpe da CIA no Irã em 1953, Digam que os EUA ainda estão interferindo no Egito

Na segunda-feira, no 60º aniversário da queda do primeiro-ministro eleito do Irã, Mohammad Mossadegh, documentos recentemente desclassificados da CIA foram publicados no site independente do Arquivo de Segurança Nacional, incluindo um dizendo que o golpe “foi realizado sob a direção da CIA como um ato da política externa dos EUA . ”

Legisladores iranianos, em um comunicado marcando o aniversário, disseram que era bem conhecido que "cortar as mãos de superpotências sedentas de petróleo [uma referência à iniciativa de Mossadegh para nacionalizar a indústria de petróleo do Irã] levou esses chamados defensores da democracia e da liberdade a derrubar o governo legal do povo iraniano. ”

“A nação iraniana não perdoará nem esquecerá o golpe militar de 1953 para submeter [a] grande nação iraniana à opressão histórica e está bem ciente de que reivindicações de direitos humanos, liberdade de expressão e democracia nada mais são do que um esquema para atropelar os direitos das nações , ”A agência de notícias Fars citou como dizendo.

Os EUA e a Grã-Bretanha eram os "mesmos velhos imperialistas", disseram os legisladores, citando sua "atual interferência nos assuntos internos do Egito" e em outros lugares.

Enquanto muitos egípcios que apóiam a tomada militar de 3 de julho acusam o governo dos EUA de apoiar a Irmandade Muçulmana de Morsi, há aqueles no Irã que argumentam que o contrário é que Washington participou da remoção de Morsi.

Em um discurso na Universidade de Teerã no início deste mês, por exemplo, o comandante da notória milícia Basij do Irã, general de brigada Mohammad Reza Naqdi, acusou os EUA de ordenar que o chefe do exército egípcio, general Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, expulsasse Morsi.

“Eles deram um golpe no Egito com o apoio dos EUA e prenderam uma pessoa que tinha o poder do voto do povo”, disse ele. “Se al-Sisi puder sobreviver, um dia leremos em seu livro que os EUA dirigiram a tendência do golpe de Estado no Egito e deram ordens a al-Sisi por meio de videoconferência.”

A Press TV, financiada pelo Estado do Irã, deu entrevistas com egípcios que acusam os EUA e a União Europeia de planejarem o "golpe" contra Morsi.

No final do mês passado, Tehran Times publicou um artigo de opinião de um especialista iraniano em assuntos regionais, Jafar Qannadbashi, que traçou paralelos entre o Irã em 1953 e o Egito em 2013.

“O comportamento dos Estados Unidos em relação à Irmandade Muçulmana foi bastante semelhante à abordagem de Washington ao governo de Mohammad Mossadegh, que governou o Irã de 1951 a 1953. Durante seu curto mandato, Mossadegh teve o apoio dos EUA e tinha quase certeza de que Washington ajudaria ele estabelecer um governo democrático. No entanto, foram os EUA que encenaram o golpe contra ele e o destituíram do poder ”, escreveu ele.

“Morsi experimentou um destino semelhante ao imaginar que o Ocidente o apoiaria em dias difíceis. Agora, os americanos revelaram seus verdadeiros motivos para a revolução egípcia, pois agora estão tentando restaurar o regime de militares e secularistas no país árabe. ”

Os documentos publicados na segunda-feira fazem parte da história interna da CIA sobre o Irã desde meados da década de 1970. Eles foram soltos pela primeira vez em 1981 como resultado de um processo judicial, mas com referências ao golpe redigido. As referências apagadas aparecem na versão mais recente.

Um dos documentos, escrito logo após o golpe por um dos planejadores da operação conjunta EUA / Inglaterra, Donald Wilber, citava a nacionalização do petróleo, o comunismo e outras preocupações.

“No final de 1952, ficou claro que o governo Mossadeq no Irã era incapaz de chegar a um acordo petrolífero com os países ocidentais interessados. Estava atingindo um estágio avançado e perigoso de financiamento ilegal, o déficit estava desrespeitando a constituição iraniana ao prolongar o governo do premiê Mohammed Mossadeq o mandato foi motivado principalmente pelo desejo de Mossadeq de poder pessoal, governado por políticas irresponsáveis ​​baseadas na emoção, que enfraqueceram o xá e o exército iraniano a um grau perigoso e cooperaram estreitamente com o Partido Tudeh (comunista) do Irã ”, escreveu Wilber.

“Em vista desses fatores, estimou-se que o Irã corria perigo real de ficar para trás da Cortina de Ferro. Se isso acontecesse, significaria uma vitória dos soviéticos na Guerra Fria e um grande revés para o Ocidente no Oriente Médio. Nenhuma ação corretiva além do plano de ação encoberto estabelecido abaixo pode ser encontrada para melhorar o estado de coisas existente. ”

Após o golpe, o xá Mohammad Reza Pahlavi governou como um autocrata, com apoio dos EUA, até a revolução islâmica em 1979.

‘História negra e crimes’

O papel da América no golpe foi admitido por altos funcionários dos EUA antes, mas, de acordo com Malcolm Byrne, o editor dos documentos publicados na segunda-feira, "o procedimento padrão da comunidade de inteligência por décadas tem sido afirmar uma negação geral".

Byrne disse que o assunto continua sendo um assunto de interesse.

“Partidários políticos de todos os lados, incluindo o governo iraniano, regularmente invocam o golpe para discutir se o Irã ou as potências estrangeiras são os principais responsáveis ​​pela trajetória histórica do país, se os Estados Unidos podem ser confiáveis ​​para respeitar a soberania do Irã ou se Washington precisa se desculpar por sua interferência prévia antes que melhores relações possam ocorrer. ”

Em 2006, o então presidente Mahmoud Ahmadinejad em uma carta ao presidente Bush disse que o povo iraniano tinha muitas perguntas a fazer aos EUA, "em particular [relacionadas ao] golpe de Estado de 19 de agosto de 1953."

“No meio da Guerra Fria, os Estados Unidos desempenharam um papel na derrubada de um governo iraniano eleito democraticamente”, disse o presidente Obama durante seu discurso de 4 de junho de 2009 no Cairo, Egito. (AP Photo / Ben Curtis, Arquivo)

Dias após a posse de Obama em 2009, Ahmadinejad exigiu que a nova administração que oferecia "mudança" deveria primeiro se desculpar pela "história negra e crimes" contra o Irã, encabeçando sua lista de queixas com a derrubada de Mossadegh.

“Com um golpe, eles derrubaram o governo nacional do Irã e o substituíram por um regime severo, impopular e despótico”, disse ele.

Em um discurso de março de 2000 ao Conselho Americano-Iraniano, a então Secretária de Estado Madeleine Albright se referiu ao "papel significativo" que os EUA desempenharam nos eventos de 1953.

“O governo Eisenhower acreditava que suas ações eram justificadas por razões estratégicas, mas o golpe foi claramente um revés para o desenvolvimento político do Irã”, disse ela. “E é fácil ver agora por que muitos iranianos continuam a se ressentir dessa intervenção da América em seus assuntos internos.”

No Fórum Econômico Mundial em Davos, cinco anos depois, o presidente Clinton comentou o incidente.

“It’s a sad story that really began in the 1950s when the United States deposed Mr. Mossadegh, who was an elected parliamentary democrat, and brought the Shah back in and then he was overturned by the Ayatollah Khomeini, driving us into the arms of one Saddam Hussein,” he said. (audio clip here)

“… [W]e got rid of their parliamentary democracy back in the ‘50s at least, that is my belief. I know it’s not popular for an American ever to say anything like this but I think it’s true. And I apologized – when President [Mohammed] Khatami was elected [in 1997] I publicly acknowledged that the United States had actively overthrown Mossadegh and I apologized for it. And I hope that we can have some rapprochement with Iran.”

Then, in his much-touted speech “to the Muslim world” in Cairo in 2009, Obama broached the subject again.

“In the middle of the Cold War, the United States played a role in the overthrow of a democratically-elected Iranian government,” he said. Obama cited both the coup and the Islamic Republic’s “role in acts of hostage-taking and violence against U.S. troops and civilians” as elements of what he called a “tumultuous history” between the two countries.

Mullahs disdained Mossadegh

Ironically – given the demands for apologies – the clerical regime that came to power in Iran in 1979 was not sympathetic to Mossadegh.

After the revolution, a major thoroughfare in Tehran named for the Shah’s Pahlavi dynasty was briefly renamed Mossadegh Street, but then quickly changed again, to Vali Asr Street, a reference to the 12th imam revered by Shi’ites.

Reacting to Clinton’s comments in Davos in 2005, Iranian author and commentator Amir Taheri wrote that Mossadegh, “far from being regarded as a national hero, is an object of intense vilification.”

“One of the first acts of the mullahs after seizing power in 1979 was to take the name of Mossadegh off a street in Tehran,” he said. “They then sealed off the village where Mossadegh is buried to prevent his supporters from gathering at his tomb.”

“History textbooks written by the mullahs present Mossadegh as the ‘son of a feudal family of exploiters who worked for the cursed Shah, and betrayed Islam.’”

Then British Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett in a 2007 op-ed dealing with the dispute over Iran’s nuclear activities wrote, “The regime wants to portray this [the nuclear standoff] as a national struggle, a rerun of Prime Minister Mossadegh’s battle with Britain in the 1950s over control of Iran’s oil revenue.”

“This is ironic. Because of other things Mossadegh stood for – like constitutional and accountable government – they are normally anxious to play down his legacy, and decline even to name a street in Tehran after him…”


50 Years After the CIA’s First Overthrow of a Democratically Elected Foreign Government We Take a Look at the 1953 US Backed Coup in Iran

After nationalizing the oil industry Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh was overthrown in a coup orchestrated by the CIA and British intelligence. We speak with Stephen Kinzer author of All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup And The Roots of Middle East Terror and Baruch College professor Ervand Abrahamian. [Includes transcript]

Click here to read to full transcript This month marks the 50th anniversary of America’s first overthrow of a democratically-elected government in the Middle East.

In 1953, the CIA and British intelligence orchestrated a coup d’etat that toppled the democratically elected government of Iran. The government of Mohammad Mossadegh. The aftershocks of the coup are still being felt.

In 1951 Prime Minister Mossadegh roused Britain’s ire when he nationalized the oil industry. Mossadegh argued that Iran should begin profiting from its vast oil reserves which had been exclusively controlled by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The company later became known as British Petroleum (BP).

After considering military action, Britain opted for a coup d’état. President Harry Truman rejected the idea, but when Dwight Eisenhower took over the White House, he ordered the CIA to embark on one of its first covert operations against a foreign government.

The coup was led by an agent named Kermit Roosevelt, the grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt. The CIA leaned on a young, insecure Shah to issue a decree dismissing Mossadegh as prime minister. Kermit Roosevelt had help from Norman Schwarzkopf’s father: Norman Schwarzkopf.

The CIA and the British helped to undermine Mossadegh’s government through bribery, libel, and orchestrated riots. Agents posing as communists threatened religious leaders, while the US ambassador lied to the prime minister about alleged attacks on American nationals.

Some 300 people died in firefights in the streets of Tehran.

Mossadegh was overthrown, sentenced to three years in prison followed by house arrest for life.

The crushing of Iran’s first democratic government ushered in more than two decades of dictatorship under the Shah, who relied heavily on US aid and arms. The anti-American backlash that toppled the Shah in 1979 shook the whole region and helped spread Islamic militancy.

After the 1979 revolution President Jimmy Carter allowed the deposed Shah into the U.S. Fearing the Shah would be sent back to take over Iran as he had been in 1953, Iranian militants took over the U.S. embassy&ndashwhere the 1953 coup was staged&ndashand held hundreds hostage.

The 50th anniversary of the coup was front-page news in Iranian newspapers. o Christian Science Monitor reports one paper in Iran publishing excerpts from CIA documents on the coup, which were released only three years ago.

The U.S. involvement in the fall of Mossadegh was not publicly acknowledged until three years ago. Em um New York Times article in March 2000, then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright admitted that “the coup was clearly a setback for Iran’s political development. And it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs.”

No livro dele All the Shah’s Men, Kinzer argues that “[i]t is not far-fetched to draw a line from Operation Ajax [the name of the coup] through the Shah’s repressive regime and the Islamic Revolution to the fireballs that engulfed the World Trade Center in New York.”

  • Stephen Kinzer, author All the Shah’s Men, An American Coup And The Roots of Middle East Terror
  • Prof. Ervand Abrahamian, Middle East and Iran Expert at Baruch College, City University of New York . Author of numerous book including Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (University of California Press, 1993).

AMY GOODMAN : Well, it’s good to have you with us. Stephen Kinzer, why don’t we begin with you. This month, August 2003, 50 years ago, the C.I.A. orchestrated a coup against the democratically elected government of Mohammad Mossadegh. Can you briefly tell us the story of how this took place?

STEPHEN KINZER : This was a hugely important episode, and looking at it from the prospective of history, we can see that it really shaped a lot of the 50 years that have followed since then in the Middle East and beyond. But yet, it’s an episode that most Americans don’t even know happened. As I was writing my book, I had the sense that I was dredging up an incident that had been largely forgotten. During my work, I realized early on that Mossadegh, the prime minister of Iran, had been the Man of the Year for Tempo magazine in 1951. And after I realized that, I went to some trouble and I finally located a copy of that Tempo revista. And I framed it, and I have it up on my wall. And it gave me the feeling that, not only am I digging up this episode again, but I’m bringing back to life this figure of Mossadegh. He was really a huge figure in the world of mid-century. This was a time, bear in mind, before the voice of the Third World, as we now call it, had ever really been raised in world councils. This was a time before Castro, before Nkrumah, before Sukharno, before Nasser. Mossadegh actually showing up in New York and laying out Iran’s case and by extension the case of poor nations against rich nations was something very, very new for the whole world. And what a figure he was. This book is full of amazing characters. Not just Kermit Roosevelt, the guy who planned the coup. But Mossaugh&mdashtall, sophisticated, European-educated aristocrat&mdashbut also highly emotional, a guy who would start sobbing and sometimes even faint dead away in Parliament when giving speeches about the suffering of the Iranian people. When he embraced the national cause of that period, which was the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, he set himself on a collision course with the great powers in the world. And that collision has produced effects which we’re still living with today.

AMY GOODMAN : Talk about the Anglo- Iranian Oil Company.

STEPHEN KINZER : The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company arrived in Iran in the early part of the twentieth century. It soon struck the largest oil well that had ever been found in the world. And for the next half-century, it pumped out hundreds of millions of dollars worth of oil from Iran. Now, Britain held this monopoly. That meant it only had to give Iran a small amount&mdashit turned out to be 16 percent&mdashof the profits from what it produced. So the Iranian oil is actually what maintained Britain at its level of prosperity and its level of military preparedness all throughout the ཚs, the 󈧬s, and the 󈧶s. Meanwhile, Iranians were getting a pittance, they were getting almost nothing from the oil that came out of their own soil. Naturally, as nationalist ideas began to spread through the world in the post-World War II era, this injustice came to grate more and more intensely on the Iranian people. So they carried Mossadegh to power very enthusiastically. On the day he was elected prime minister, Parliament also agreed unanimously to proceed with the nationalization of the oil company. And the British responded as you would imagine. Their first response was disbelief. They just couldn't believe that someone in some weird faraway country&mdashwhich was the way they perceived Iran&mdashwould stand up and challenge such an important monopoly. This was actually the largest company in the entire British Empire. When it finally became clear that Mossadegh was quite serious, the British decided to launch an invasion. They drew up plans for seizing the oil refinery and the oil fields. But President Truman went nuts when he heard this and he told the British, under no circumstances can we possibly tolerate a British invasion of Iran. So then the British went to their next plan, which was to get a United Nations resolution demanding that Mossadegh return the oil company. But Mossadegh embraced this idea of a U.N. debate so enthusiastically that he decided to come to New York himself and he was so impressive that the U.N. refused to adopt the British motion. So finally, the British decided that they would stage a coup, they would overthrow Mossadegh. But what happened, Mossadegh found out about this and he did the only thing he could have done to protect himself against the coup. He closed the British embassy and he sent all the British diplomats packing, including, among them, all the secret agents who were planning to stage the coup. So now, the British had to turn to the United States. They went to Truman and asked him, please overthrow Mossadegh for us. Ele disse não. He said the C.I.A. had never overthrown a government and, as far as he was concerned, it never should. So, now, the British were completely without resources. They couldn’t launch an invasion, the U.N. had turned down their complaint, they had no agents to stage a coup. So they were stymied. It wasn’t until November of 1952 when British foreign office and intelligence officials received the electrifying news that Dwight Eisenhower had been elected president that things began to change. They rushed one of their agents over to Washington. He made a special appeal to the incoming Eisenhower administration. And that administration reversed the Truman policy agreed to send Kermit Roosevelt to Tehran to carry out this fateful coup.

AMY GOODMAN : When we come back from our break, we’ll find out just what Kermit Roosevelt, the grandson of Teddy Roosevelt, and Norman Schwarzkopf, the father of the man who led the Persian Gulf War, Norman Schwarzkopf, did in Iran. Stay with us. We’re talking to Stephen Kinzer. He’s author of All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. [¶MUSIC BREAK¶]

AMY GOODMAN : You are listening to Democracy Now!, the War and Peace Report. I’m Amy Goodman on this 50th anniversary of the C.I.A.-backed coup that overthrew the democratically elected prime minister of Iran, Mohammad Mossadegh. We’re talking to Stephen Kinzer. He is author of a new book, All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. In a minute, we’re going to go to old film about the coup where former C.I.A. agents talk about their role in it. But talk about the man in the C.I.A. who spearheaded this, Kermit Roosevelt.

STEPHEN KINZER : One of the reasons I wanted to write this book was because I’ve always been curious about exactly how you go about overthrowing a government. What do you do after you choose an agent and assign a lot of money? Exactly how do you go about doing it? Kermit Roosevelt really is a wonderful way to answer that question. What happened was this: Kermit Roosevelt, who as you said was Teddy Roosevelt’s grandson, was the Near East director for the C.I.A. He slipped clandestinely into Iran just around the end of July 1953. He spent a total of less than three weeks in Iran&mdashthat’s only how long it took him to overthrow the government of Mossadegh. And one thing that I did realize as I was piecing together this story is how easy it is for a rich, powerful country to throw a poor, weak country into chaos. So what did Roosevelt do? The first thing he did was he wanted to set Tehran on fire. He wanted to make Iran fall into chaos. So he bribed a whole number of politicians, members of Parliament, religious leaders, newspaper editors and reporters, to begin a very intense campaign against Mossadegh. This campaign was full of denunciatory speeches and lies about Mossadegh, dated and passed, without bitter denunciations of Mossadegh from the pulpits and in the streets, on the houses of Parliament. Then, Roosevelt also went out and bribed leaders of street gangs. You had a kind of “Mobs 'R' Us,” mobs-for-hire, kind of situation existing in Iran that that time. Roosevelt got in touch with the leaders of these mobs. Finally, he also bribed a number of military officers who would be willing to bring their troops in on his side at the appropriate moment. So when that moment came, the fig leaf of the coup was, as you said, this document that the Shah had signed, rejecting the prime ministership of Mossadegh, essentially firing him from office. Now, this was a decree that was of very dubious legality since in democratic Iran only the Parliament could hire and fire prime ministers. Nonetheless, the idea was that this decree would be delivered to Mossedegh at his house at midnight one night and then, when he refused to obey it, as he probably would, he would be arrested. That was the plot. But what happened was that the officer that Kermit Roosevelt had chosen to go to Mossdegh’s house at midnight, presented the decree firing Mossadegh and preparing to arrest him but other, loyal soldiers stepped out of the shadows and arrested him. The coup had been betrayed. The plot failed. The man who was supposed to arrest Mossadegh was himself arrested. And Kermit Roosevelt woke up the next day with a cable from his superiors in the C.I.A. telling him, My God, you failed, you better get out of there right away before they find you and kill you. But Kermit Roosevelt, on his own, decided that he would stay. He figured, I can still do this, I was sent here to overthrow this government, I’m going to make up my own plan.

AMY GOODMAN : Now he had had help before from Norman Schwarzkopf, is that right, Schwarzkopf’s father?

STEPHEN KINZER : There’s a fantastic cast of characters in this story and one of them is Norman Schwarzkopf, who had been the head of the investigation into the Lindhburg kidnapping while with the New Jersey state police, had spent many years in Iran during the 1940s, and was a very flamboyant figure with great influence on the Shah. He was one of the people that Kermit Roosevelt brought in to pressure the timid Shah into signing this fateful decree. Now, the decree finally failed to have its desired effect, as I said. And then Roosevelt on his own devised this plan where, first of all, he sent rioters out into the streets to pretend that they were pro-Mossadegh. They were supposed to yell “I love Mossadegh and communism. I want a people’s republic!” and then loot stores, shoot into mosques, break windows, and generally make themselves repugnant to good citizens. Then he hired another mob to attack his first mob, thereby creating the impression that Iran was falling into anarchy. And finally on the climactic day, August 19, 1953, he brought all his mobs together, mobilized all of his military units, stormed a number of government buildings and then, in the climactic gunbattle at Mossadegh’s house, a hundred people were killed until finally the coup succeeded, Mossadegh had to flee and was later arrested, and the Shah, who had fled in panic at the first sign of trouble a few days earlier, returned in triumph to Tehran and began what became 25 years of increasingly brutal and repressive rule.

AMY GOODMAN : That issue of the U.S. government funding both the people in the streets who pretended that they were for Mossadegh but communist, and against Mossadegh, pro-Shah, I would like our guest, professor Ervand Abrahamian, Middle East and Iran expert at Baruch College, to comment on. This was a time, the British had used the ruse of anti-communism supposedly to lure in the U.S. Do you think the U.S. was fully well aware of the issue of oil being at the core of this, and also them possibly getting a cut of those oil sales.

ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN : Yes, I think oil is the central issue. But of course this was done at the height of the Cold War, so much of the discourse at the time linked it to the Cold War. I think many liberal historians, including of course Stephen Kinzer’s wonderful book here, even though it’s very good in dealing with the tragedy of the ཱ coup, still puts it in this liberal framework that the tragedy, the original intentions, were benign.&mdashthat the U.S. really got into it because of the Cold War and it was hoodwinked into it by the nasty British who of course had oil interests, but the U.S. somehow was different. U.S. Eisenhower's interest, were really anti-communism. I sort of doubt that interpretation. For me, the oil was important both for the United States and for Britain. It’s not just the question of oil in Iran. It was a question of control over oil internationally. If Mossadegh had succeeded in nationalizing the British oil industry in Iran, that would have set an example and was seen at that time by the Americans as a threat to U.S. oil interests throughout the world, because other countries would do the same. Once you have control, then you can determine how much oil you produce in your country, who you sell it to, when you sell it, and that meant basically shifting power from the oil companies, both British Petroleum, Angloversion, American companies, shifting it to local countries like Iran and Venezuela. And in this, the U.S. had as much stake in preventing nationalization in Iran as the British did. So here there was not really a major difference between the United States and the British. The question really was on tactics. Truman was persuaded that he could in a way nudge Mossadegh to give up the concept of nationalization, that somehow you could have a package where it was seen as if it was nationalized but, in reality, power would remain in the hands of Western oil companies. And Mossadegh refused to go along with this facade. He wanted real nationalization, both in theory and practice. So the Truman administration, in a way, was not that different from the British view of keeping control. Then, the Truman policy was then, if Mossadegh was not willing to do this, then he could be shoved aside through politics by the Shah dismissing him or the Parliament in Iran dismissing him. But again, it was not that different from the British view. Where the shift came was that after July of 󈧸, it became clear even to the American ambassador in Iran that Mossadegh could not be got rid of through the political process. He had too much popularity, and after July 󈧹, the U.S. really went along with the British view of a coup, indeed to have a military coup. So even before Eisenhower came in, the U.S. was working closely with the British to carry out the coup. And what came out of the coup was of course the oil industry on paper remained Iranian, nationalized, but in reality it was controlled by a consortium. In that consortium the British still retained more than 50 percent, but the U.S. got a good 40 percent of that control.

AMY GOODMAN : I said at the top, this month marks the 50th anniversary of America’s first intervention in the Middle East. I should have said, of America’s first overthrow of a democratically elected government. But, Stephen Kinzer, the statement that you make in your book, it is not far-fetched to draw a line from Operation Ajax, which the U.S. had called the coup through the Shah’s repressive regime and the Islamic revolution to the fireballs that engulfed the World Trade Center in New York. Can you flush that out?

STEPHEN KINZER : The goal of our coup was to overthrow Prime Minister Mossadegh and place the Shah back in his throne. And we succeeded in doing that. But from the perspective of decades of history, we can look back and ask whether what seemed like a success really was a success. The Shah whom we brought back to power became a harsh dictator. His repression set off the revolution of 1979, and that revolution brought to power a group of fanatic anti-Western, religious clerics whose government sponsored acts of terror against American targets, and that government also inspired fundamentalists in other countries including next door, Afghanistan, where the Taliban came to power and gave sanctuary to Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. So, I think you can&mdashwhile it’s always difficult to draw direct cause and effect lines in history&mdashsee that this episode has had shattering effects for the United States. And let’s consider one other of the many negative affects this has had. When we overthrew a democratic government in Iran 50 years ago, we sent a message, not only to Iran, but throughout the entire Middle East. That message was that the United States does not support democratic governments and the United States prefers strong-man rule that will guarantee us access to oil. And that pushed an entire generation of leaders in the Middle East away from democracy. We sent the opposite message that we should have sent. Instead of sending the message that we wanted democracy, we sent a message that we wanted dictatorship in the Middle East, and a lot of people in the Middle East got that message very clearly and that helped to lead to the political trouble we face there today.

AMY GOODMAN : Right after the Shah was deposed by the Ayatollah Khomeini and the Iranian revolution of 1979 and then the Iranian students took over the U.S. embassy, I’m wondering, Professor Abrahamian, how often did the press, and understanding through the hundreds of days that the hostages were held, go back to the 1953 coup and explain the fears of the students that in 1953 the Shah had fled thinking that the coup had been fought back and the U.S. brought him back and that now that Jimmy Carter had allowed him into the United States, that they might be staging another possible coup, leading the students to fear this and to take the hostages.

ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN : I think on this issue actually you see a big cultural gap between the American public and the Iranian public. For the Iranian public, the ཱ coup shapes basically Iranian history, as Stephen shows very much in his book. But for Americans, the 󈧹 coup was something unreal for them. It wasn't something they were aware of. If they were aware it, it was like Jimmy Carter saying that this was ancient history. For the U.S. it may have been ancient history but for Iranians it was not. So when the students took over the embassy, they actually called it the “den of spies” because they knew that in 󈧹 the coup had been actually plotted from the U.S. compound. So they were&mdash

AMY GOODMAN : That very building that they took over.

ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN : That very building. And that, for Iranians, was a central issue. In the United States, if you watch how the media covered it here, it saw the hostage crisis as Iranian emotional rampaging mobs in the streets calling for death of America and the 󈧹 coup was intentionally not brought into that context. So you can go for reams of programs on the main channels in the United States about the hostage crisis, which lasted 444 days, and you rarely get the mention of the 󈧹 coup. This was intentional. The media here did not want to make that link to 󈧹.


CIA-assisted coup overthrows government of Iran - HISTORY

Washington, D.C., November 29, 2000 &ndash The CIA history of operation TPAJAX excerpted below was first disclosed by James Risen of O jornal New York Times in its editions of April 16 and June 18, 2000, and posted in this form on its website at:

This extremely important document is one of the last major pieces of the puzzle explaining American and British roles in the August 1953 coup against Iranian Premier Mohammad Mossadeq. Written in March 1954 by Donald Wilber, one of the operation's chief planners, the 200-page document is essentially an after-action report, apparently based in part on agency cable traffic and Wilber's interviews with agents who had been on the ground in Iran as the operation lurched to its conclusion.

Long-sought by historians, the Wilber history is all the more valuable because it is one of the relatively few documents that still exists after an unknown quantity of materials was destroyed by CIA operatives reportedly "routinely" in the 1960s, according to former CIA Director James Woolsey. However, according to an investigation by the National Archives and Records Administration, released in March 2000, "no schedules in effect during the period 1959-1963 provided for the disposal of records related to covert actions and, therefore, the destruction of records related to Iran was unauthorized." (p. 22) The CIA now says that about 1,000 pages of documentation remain locked in agency vaults.

During the 1990s, three successive CIA heads pledged to review and release historically valuable materials on this and 10 other widely-known covert operations from the period of the Cold War, but in 1998, citing resource restrictions, current Director George Tenet reneged on these promises, a decision which prompted the National Security Archive to file a lawsuit in 1999 for this history of the 1953 operation and one other that is known to exist. So far, the CIA has effectively refused to declassify either document, releasing just one sentence out of 339 pages at issue. That sentence reads: "Headquarters spent a day featured by depression and despair." In a sworn statement by William McNair, the information review officer for the CIA's directorate of operations, McNair claimed that release of any other part of this document other than the one line that had previously appeared in Wilber's memoirs, would "reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to the national security of the United States." Clearly, the "former official" who gave this document to O jornal New York Times disagreed with McNair, and we suspect you will too, once you read this for yourself. The case is currently pending before a federal judge. (See related item on this site: "Archive Wins Freedom of Information Ruling Versus CIA")

In disclosing this history, the Vezes initially reproduced only a summary and four appendixes to the original document. It prefaced each excerpt with a statement explaining that it was withholding the main text of the document on the grounds that "there might be serious risk that some of those named as foreign agents would face retribution in Iran." Eventually, the Vezes produced the main document after excising the names and descriptions of virtually every Iranian mentioned.

In posting the main body of the history on June 18, 2000, the Vezes' technical staff tried to digitally black out the unfamiliar Iranian names, but enterprising Web users soon discovered that in some cases the hidden text could be "revealed" without much technical savvy. o Vezes quickly pulled those portions of the document and reposted them using a more fool-proof redaction method. The Archive is reproducing the latter versions of the document, even though most of the individuals known to be named in the history are either already dead or have long since left Iran.

The posting of this document is itself an important event. Although newspapers regularly print stories based on leaked documents, they far more rarely publish the documents themselves, typically for lack of space. The World Wide Web now offers a tremendous opportunity for the public to get direct access to at least some of the sources underlying these important stories much like footnotes rather than relying on second-hand accounts alone. o Vezes performed a valuable public service in making available virtually the entire Wilber history. Its precedent should be a model for future reporting that unveils the documentary record.

Apesar de Vezes' publication was not without controversy, mainly over the unwitting revelation of Iranian names, fundamental responsibility for their exposure rests with those officials at the CIA who, despite compelling public interest and the filing of a lawsuit, insisted that virtually the entire document had to remain sealed. As Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists put it:

Much more important than the NYT article are the two documents appended to the summary document giving operational plans for the coup. These contain a wealth of interesting information. They indicate that the British played a larger though still subordinate role in the coup than was previously known, providing part of the financing for it and using their intelligence network (led by the Rashidian brothers) to influence members of the parliament and do other things. The CIA described the coup plan as "quasi-legal," referring to the fact that the shah legally dismissed Mossadeq but presumably acknowledging that he did not do so on his own initiative. These documents make clear that the CIA was prepared to go forward with the coup even if the shah opposed it. There is a suggestion that the CIA use counterfeit Iranian currency to somehow show that Mossadeq was ruining the economy, though I'm not sure this was ever done. The documents indicate that Fazlollah Zahedi and his military colleagues were given large sums of money (at least $50,000) before the coup, perhaps to buy their support. Most interestingly, they indicate that various clerical leaders and organizations whose names are blanked out were to play a major role in the coup. Finally, the author(s) of the London plan presumably Wilber and Derbyshire say some rather nasty things about the Iranians, including that there is a "recognized incapacity of Iranians to plan or act in a thoroughly logical manner."

Perhaps the most general conclusion that can be drawn from these documents is that the CIA extensively stage-managed the entire coup, not only carrying it out but also preparing the groundwork for it by subordinating various important Iranian political actors and using propaganda and other instruments to influence public opinion against Mossadeq. This is a point that was made in my article and other published accounts, but it is strongly confirmed in these documents. In my view, this thoroughly refutes the argument that is commonly made in Iranian monarchist exile circles that the coup was a legitimate "popular uprising" on behalf of the shah.

In reply to Nikki Keddie's (UCLA) questions about whether the NYT article got the story right, I would say it is impossible to tell until the 200-page document comes out. Nikki's additional comment that these documents may not be entirely factual but may instead reveal certain biases held by their authors is an important one. Wilber was not in Iran while the coup was occurring, and his account of it can only have been based on his debriefing of Kermit Roosevelt and other participants. Some facts were inevitably lost or misinterpreted in this process, especially since this was a rapidly changing series of events. This being said, I doubt that there will be any major errors in the 200-page history. While Wilber had his biases, he certainly was a competent historian. I can think of no reason he might have wanted to distort this account.

CIA Clandestine Service History, "Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran,
November 1952-August 1953," March 1954, by Dr. Donald Wilber.


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State Department Release Official History Of CIA Orchestrated Iranian Coup

The long-awaited volume supplements an earlier publication that whitewashed American and British roles in the coup.

The Shah of Iran Reza Pahlavi, left, and President Harry Truman pose on the speakers rostrum during welcoming ceremonies at National Airport on Nov. 16, 1949 in Washington. (AP Photo)

The State Department today released a long-awaited “retrospective” volume of declassified U.S. government documents on the 1953 coup in Iran, including records describing planning and implementation of the covert operation. The publication is the culmination of decades of internal debates and public controversy after a previous official collection omitted all references to the role of American and British intelligence in the ouster of Iran’s then-prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddeq. The volume is part of the Department’s venerable Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series.

For decades, neither the U.S. nor the British governments would acknowledge their part in Mosaddeq’s overthrow, even though a detailed account appeared as early as 1954 in The Saturday Evening Post, and since then CIA and MI6 veterans of the coup have published memoirs detailing their activities. Kermit Roosevelt’s Countercoup is the best known and most detailed such account, although highly controversial because of its selective rendering of events. In 2000, O jornal New York Times posted a 200-page classified internal CIA history of the operation.

In 1989, the State Department released what purported to be the official record of the coup period but it made not a single reference to American and British actions in connection with the event. The omission led to the resignation of the chief outside advisor on the series and prompted Congress to pass legislation requiring “a thorough, accurate, and reliable documentary record” of U.S. foreign policy. After the end of the Cold War, the CIA committed to open agency files on the Iran and other covert operations, and the State Department vowed to produce a “retrospective” volume righting the earlier decision.

But it took until 2011 for the CIA to – partially – fulfill its commitment, and even then it was only in the form of a previously classified segment of an internal account of the coup that for the first time included an officially released explicit reference to the agency’s role in “TPAJAX,” the U.S. acronym for the operation. Roughly two years later, after years of research by historian James C. Van Hook, as well as internal negotiations between State and CIA over access to the latter’s records, the Office of the Historian at the Department produced a draft of the retrospective volume, which then had to await top-level clearance.

What explains the refusal by two governments to acknowledge their actions, and the inordinate delays in publishing this volume? Justifications given in the past include protecting intelligence sources and methods, bowing to British government requests and, more recently, avoiding stirring up Iranian hardline elements who might seek to undercut the nuclear deal Iran signed with the United States and other P5+1 members in 2015.

While the volume’s contents still are being sifted through, here’s a description from the Preface:

Esse Foreign Relations retrospective volume focuses on the use of covert operations by the Truman and Eisenhower administrations as an adjunct to their respective policies toward Iran, culminating in the overthrow of the Mosadeq government in August 1953. Moreover, the volume documents the involvement of the U.S. intelligence community in the policy formulation process and places it within the broader Cold War context. For a full appreciation of U.S. relations with Iran between 1951 and 1954, this volume should be read in conjunction with the volume published in 1989.

“This is going to be an important source for anyone interested in the tortured relationship between Washington and Tehran,” said Malcolm Byrne, who runs the National Security Archive’s Iran-U.S. Relations Project. “But the fact that it has taken over six decades to declassify and release these records about such a pivotal historical event is mind-boggling.”

As Archive staff make their way through the hundreds of records in the volume, we will update this posting with highlights.


CIA Admits It Was Behind Iran’s Coup

Sixty years ago this Monday, on August 19, 1953, modern Iranian history took a critical turn when a U.S.- and British-backed coup overthrew the country’s prime minister, Mohammed Mossadegh. The event’s reverberations have haunted its orchestrators over the years, contributing to the anti-Americanism that accompanied the Shah’s ouster in early 1979, and even influencing the Iranians who seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran later that year.

But it has taken almost six decades for the U.S. intelligence community to acknowledge openly that it was behind the controversial overthrow. Published here today — and on the website of the National Security Archive, which obtained the document through the Freedom of Information Act — is a brief excerpt from The Battle for Iran, an internal report prepared in the mid-1970s by an in-house CIA historian.

Sixty years ago this Monday, on August 19, 1953, modern Iranian history took a critical turn when a U.S.- and British-backed coup overthrew the country’s prime minister, Mohammed Mossadegh. The event’s reverberations have haunted its orchestrators over the years, contributing to the anti-Americanism that accompanied the Shah’s ouster in early 1979, and even influencing the Iranians who seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran later that year.

But it has taken almost six decades for the U.S. intelligence community to acknowledge openly that it was behind the controversial overthrow. Published here today — and on the website of the National Security Archive, which obtained the document through the Freedom of Information Act — is a brief excerpt from The Battle for Iran, an internal report prepared in the mid-1970s by an in-house CIA historian.

The document was first released in 1981, but with most of it excised, including all of Section III, entitled “Covert Action” — the part that describes the coup itself. Most of that section remains under wraps, but this new version does formally make public, for the first time that we know of, the fact of the agency’s participation: “[T]he military coup that overthrew Mosadeq and his National Front cabinet was carried out under CIA direction as an act of U.S. foreign policy,” the history reads. The risk of leaving Iran “open to Soviet aggression,” it adds, “compelled the United States … in planning and executing TPAJAX.”

TPAJAX was the CIA’s codename for the overthrow plot, which relied on local collaborators at every stage. It consisted of several steps: using propaganda to undermine Mossadegh politically, inducing the Shah to cooperate, bribing members of parliament, organizing the security forces, and ginning up public demonstrations. The initial attempt actually failed, but after a mad scramble the coup forces pulled themselves together and came through on their second try, on August 19.

Why the CIA finally chose to own up to its role is as unclear as some of the reasons it has held onto this information for so long. CIA and British operatives have written books and articles on the operation — notably Kermit Roosevelt, the agency’s chief overseer of the coup. Scholars have produced many more books, including several just in the past few years. Moreover, two American presidents (Clinton and Obama) have publicly acknowledged the U.S. role in the coup.

But U.S. government classifiers, especially in the intelligence community, often have a different view on these matters. They worry that disclosing “sources and methods” — even for operations decades in the past and involving age-old methods like propaganda — might help an adversary. They insist there is a world of difference between what becomes publicly known unofficially (through leaks, for example) and what the government formally acknowledges. (Somehow those presidential admissions of American involvement seem not to have counted.)

Finally, there is the priority of maintaining good relations with allies, particularly in the intelligence arena. Registros britânicos de vários anos atrás (veja o National Security Archive & # 8217s postando hoje) mostram que o Foreign Office (e provavelmente o MI6, que ajudou a planejar e executar o golpe) está ansioso para não deixar escapar nenhuma palavra oficial sobre seu envolvimento. Para observadores externos, esse subterfúgio beira o ridículo, visto que os iranianos assumiram o papel de Londres por tanto tempo. No entanto, pela maioria dos indicadores, a comunidade de inteligência dos EUA tem ido junto, independentemente das consequências para os americanos e # 8217 a compreensão de sua própria história.

O fato de que a CIA agora optou por mudar de direção, pelo menos até agora, é algo que deve ser saudado. Só podemos esperar que leve a decisões semelhantes para abrir o registro histórico sobre tópicos que ainda importam hoje.


Assista o vídeo: Golpe dos EUA CIA no Irã em 1953